anterior to that at which the historians attempt to acquire their knowledge. Put like that, historians seem to be at an epistemic disadvantage. How much better it would be if their attempt to acquire their knowledge could take place at the very same time as the events about which they are attempting to know! Then they could make use of a genuinely reliable source of information: they could actually witness the events, as they happen, rather than relying on the necessarily unreliable sources that constitute their ordinary stock-in-trade.
In this line of thought, the fact that historians' standpoint is future to the putative objects of their knowledge places a limitation on their epistemic capacity. Perhaps the fact that historians have such a standpoint constitutes a barrier to historical knowledge: they cannot acquire knowledge of the relevant propositions, because the only way for them to do so would be to do what they cannot do, and witness the relevant events, as they happen. Or perhaps the fact constitutes a fetter on historical knowledge: they can only acquire knowledge of those relevant propositions that are couched at a suitably high level of abstraction -<Henry VII lived sometime before the start of the 17 th century > for example, but not <on the 22 nd August 1485, Henry VII was victorious at the Battle of Bosworth Field> -because the only way for historians to acquire knowledge of relevant propositions at lower levels would be to do what they cannot do, and witness the relevant events, as they happen.
Danto's Kantian aim is to turn the game played by the sceptic against itself, by showing that it is, neither a fetter on, nor a barrier to, but a condition of the possibility of historical knowledge that it is acquired from a standpoint future to the events it concerns.
Historical knowledge can only be acquired from this standpoint. Witnessing is of no help.
In line with the spirit of his philosophical age, Danto introduces the idea of historical knowledge by reference to the kind of sentences that may be used to express it; what he calls narrative sentences, and characterises as follows.
[The] most general characteristic [of narrative sentences] is that they refer to at least two time-separated events though they only describe (are only about) the earliest event to which they refer. Commonly they take the past tense, and indeed it would be odd … for them to take any other tense. Narrative sentences refer to at least two time-separated events, and describe the earlier event. But in a sense this structure is exhibited in a whole class of sentences used to describe actions.
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And actions are surely events of a sort that interest historians.
'NN rang the bell' seems to be a representative example of a sentence that can be used to describe actions. It also seems to be an example of a sentence that exhibits the structure Danto has in mind. The following seems to be true of this sentence. First, its truth turns on the occurrence of a particular event, viz. a ringing of the bell; an event to which it may thereby be said to refer. Second, its truth also turns on whether this particular event causes an event in its future, viz. the bell's ringing; an event to which it may thereby also be said to refer. 12 So, it seems as if its truth turns on whether the earlier of the two events to which it refers causes the later of the two events. 13 In other words, it seems as if it is a -covert -narrative sentence, and, as such, excluded from the Ideal Chronicle. Must every sentence suitable for describing action suffer this fate?
Danto thinks not. He thinks that at least some actions can be described by nonnarrative sentences. He reasons as follows.
'NN rang the bell' says what NN has done. But 'NN is ringing the bell' says what NN is doing. And it is possible to say truly that someone is doing something even though it is not, and will not be, possible to say truly that she has done it. 'NN is ringing a bell' seems not to exhibit this structure. But consider a sentence describing a more creative, 11 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 159. 12 Of course this is not an uncontroversial notion of reference. But it seems as if the position under discussion needs it, or something like it, if it is to make good on its claim that sentences descriptive of action are narrative sentences. 13 No doubt it is an analytic truth that if there is a ringing of the bell then there is the bell's ringing. But Davidson has taught us that that is no obstacle to the first's event's being a cause of the second. And his case seems to turn on the fact that the former event satisfies at least one another description that cannot be pressed into such a truth; 'a pulling of the cord', for example. (It may be true that if there is a pulling of the cord then there is a ringing of the bell. But it cannot be an analytic truth.) See Donald Davidson, 'Actions, Reasons, and Causes' (1963) , in his Essays on Actions and Events (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001).
less punctuate, exercise of agency -'NN is writing a book', or 'NN is baking a cake'; a sentence in the so-called present progressive tense. It may be true to say that NN is writing a book, even though no particular book emerges as a result of her writing (perhaps because she suffers writer's block at some point in the writing process).
Exercises of agency are not special in this regard: it may be true to say of a tree that it is falling to the ground even though the tree does not fall to the ground (perhaps because someone catches it at some point in the falling process).
We might try to understand sentences such as 'NN is writing a book' on the Each suggestion looks hopeless in the light of the phenomenon we have just noted. A thing can be the subject of a particular event only if the thing in question is, or perhaps has been, in existence. So, there can be a particular event whose subject is a book only if the book in question is, or perhaps has been, in existence. And so, to say that the truth of 'NN is writing a book' turns on the occurrence of an event whose subject is a book is to say that its truth turns on the existence of a particular book. But, as we have seen, its truth does not turn on the existence of a particular book. So, the model breaks down at this point. And with its demise goes the demise of our attempt to press every description of action into the form of a narrative sentence. Or so Danto assumes.
It seems to me that Danto makes a persuasive case for his claim that not all sentences descriptive of action are narrative sentences. But it does not follow that the Ideal Chronicle is thereby shown to be an aid to help historians. And this is because the worry that the Chronicle lacks the resources to describe action remains.
14 Of course some philosophers once thought they could so consist. For a good overview and critique of the relevant literature, see Helen Steward, The Ontology of Mind: Events, Processes, and States (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).
In this paper, I have spoken of events such as a ringing of the bell. I have also said such things as: NN is ringing a bell. We may surely say that both of these ways of speaking are ways of describing action. But it is not clear that they are equivalent. The following has been suggested: just as it can be true that NN is writing a book without it being true that there is a book b such that NN wrote b, so it can be true that NN is writing a book without it being true that there is an action -in the sense of a particular event -of writing a book a such that NN engaged in a. Of course, if NN is writing a book then NN is executing an action of writing a book. But just as it does not follow from this that there is a particular book such that NN has written that, so it does not follow that there is a particular action of writing a book such that NN has executed that. One can be writing a book even though a particular book does not emerge from the process. In the same way, one can be executing an action even though a particular action does not emerge from the process. As we might put it: just as books do not enter the world until they are completed (viz. written), so actions do not enter the world until they are completed (viz. executed).
I cannot pretend that this argument is conclusive. 15 But it is at least suggestive, and if it is sound it shows that there are at least some descriptions of action -some descriptions to the effect that someone is doing something -that do not refer to a particular event. There are, as it were, some descriptions of action in execution that are not descriptions of executed actions. So, we may say that, if the argument is sound, then there are some descriptions of action that cannot figure in the Ideal Chronicle -not because the Chronicle cannot make use of narrative sentences, but because it can only make use of sentences that describe particular events. And yet, it seems it cannot make use of sentences that describe particular events where these events are actions, precisely because such sentences -sentences such as 'NN wrote the book', and 'NN rang the bell' -are, surely, narrative sentences (of the sort exposed seven paragraphs back).
The upshot is that the Chronicle cannot contain sentences descriptive of action. being of no use to historians -viz. sentences in the progressive -serve, if this argument is right, not to save the Chronicle from being useless, but to secure its uselessness, in the present regard.
Even though I have sought to question one of Danto's assumptions regarding the Ideal Chronicle, I hope it is clear that my way of doing so emerges from his own pathbreaking, and insufficiently appreciated, emphasis on the significance of the progressive.
I have passed over many of the interesting things Danto has to say on this matter, and only focussed on those aspects of his writings on the progressive that shed light on our central topic; viz. the scope and significance of narrative sentences for our understanding of historical knowledge.
The point of Danto's characterisation of historical knowledge in terms of
narrative sentences is to provide a foundation for his attack on the possibility of historical foreknowledge -the putative historical knowledge that substantive philosophers of history take themselves to unearth.
As we have seen, Danto thinks it a condition of the possibility of historical knowledge that it is acquired from a standpoint future to the event it is about (in Danto's somewhat technical sense of 'about'; see §2). But, according to Danto, the idea of historical foreknowledge is the idea of historical knowledge that is acquired from a standpoint prior to the event it is about. And that makes it tempting to conclude that historical foreknowledge is impossible, precisely because the very idea of such knowledge is the idea of historical knowledge shorn of one of its conditions of possibility.
But that conclusion rests on a slide between two different senses of 'standpoint'.
To say that historical knowledge can only be acquired from a future standpoint might be to say that it must involve knowledge of what happens in the future of the event it is about. But it might also be to say that it can only acquired by someone whose present historical location is in the future of the event it is about. The proponent of historical foreknowledge acknowledges the need for the future standpoint in the first sense. But she denies the need for the future standpoint in the second sense. To have a case against the substantive philosophy of history, Danto needs to establish that historical foreknowledge demands a future standpoint not only in the first sense, but in the second sense as well. And for that a new argument is needed.
As far as I can see, Danto thinks he has not one, but two arguments which establish this conclusion.
5. The first argument is simple to describe, but hard to accept.
According to Danto, the assumption that historical foreknowledge is possible is inconsistent with "our common way of viewing time, truth, and the world". That is a striking argument. At its heart is the claim that future-referring
propositions cannot be true. Danto does not so much argue for this claim as commend it to us as part of "our common way of viewing time, truth, and the world". His commendation rests on the assumption that there are not simply tensed sentences but also tensed propositions. Past-referring propositions in the past tense, and present-referring propositions in the present tense, can be true or false. <Argentina are invading the Falkland Islands> is true when the invasion is happening, and false at any other time.
<Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands> is true when the invasion has happened, and 16 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 194. historians of the future are going to say. Therefore, we do not have historical foreknowledge.
The propositional contents of historical knowledge -what we might call historical propositions -are expressed in true narrative sentences. But not just any true narrative sentence will serve to express a historical proposition. Historical knowledge is knowledge of the historical significance of events. A narrative sentence expresses a historical proposition if, and only if, it displays the historical significance of the event it
17 Lydia Goehr makes much of the importance of this point for Danto's arguments. See Goehr 'Afterwords: An Introduction to Arthur Danto's Narration and Knowledge (including his Analytical Philosophy of History), in Danto, Narration and Knowledge. But because Danto's concern is historical knowledge and historical representation, he needs to claim that his first argument applies to propositions as well as to sentences, and that is a distinct point. 18 Danto, Narration and Knowledge, p. 180. It is possible to reconstruct Danto's argument so that it does not face this hurdle.
But when we do so we will see that his argument is wholly independent of his conception of historical significance. The argument would go through even if historical foreknowledge amounted simply to knowledge of (a). It seems to me plausible that this argument is sound. But something needs to be said in defence of the inferential step from its first premise to its interim conclusion.
The thought underlying this step might be put as follows. If someone believes that a certain event will not occur until a certain point in time, and it is in my power to bring this event about whenever I wish, I can ensure that the event occurs at some earlier point in time, and thereby ensure that the person's belief is false. Of course, if I do 19 That may include historians' starting to be interested in various events. But it needs not do so.
falsify his belief in this way, his belief does not constitute knowledge. But even if I do not falsify his belief in this way, and even his belief is true, the fact that I am able easily to falsify his belief ensures that his belief does not constitute knowledge.
The correctness of this last claim turns on how we are to understand the idea of a belief that I am able easily to falsify. It is a platitude of contemporary epistemology that if a belief constitutes knowledge, then it could not easily be false. 20 But a true belief I am able easily to falsify is a belief that could easily be false. Exactly how we are to flesh out the idea expressed by the phrase 'could not easily be false' is a matter of debate, of course. 21 But it is surely plausible to suppose that, if I am not merely able to falsify the aforementioned belief by ensuring that the relevant event does not happen, but fully intend to do so, and yet not do so because I am momentarily distracted, then although the belief is true, it could easily be false, and so does not constitute knowledge.
The soundness of the argument should now be plausible. It is plausible to think there are some propositions about the future that we cannot know. The exact scope of these propositions is not an issue I need to enter here. But it is unlikely to be especially broad. So, for all Danto's second argument can mandate, there may events in the future of which we have historical foreknowledge. At best, Danto's argument exposes, not the impossibility, but the limits of the substantive philosophy of history.
7. Danto does not establish the impossibility of historical foreknowledge. But he may, plausibly, be thought to have shown that there is a limit to what a substantive philosophy of history can achieve. And, in the course of so doing, he succeeds in shedding light on that under-appreciated feature of human agency signalled by the fact that many of the sentences we use to describe action are in the progressive tense.
Of course, Danto wants to do more than this. He wants to close down the substantive philosophy of history, twice over in fact. And he wants to do so, on each occasion, with no more than an a priori argument. But it seems to me that a better way to 20 To pick an example at random: 
